A pretty bad opinion piece I authored a while back, but what the heck. Enjoy!
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon has seen its share of conflicts since its establishment thirty years ago. UNIFIL, as it has come to be known as, was established by the United Nations Security Council through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 on March 19, 1978. This was brought about by cross-border skirmishes between the State of Israel and Palestinian guerillas affiliated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization who had set up camps along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon border. UNIFIL’s was mandated with the following tasks: a) Confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon; b) restore international peace and security; c) assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. Lebanon’s historical record since the establishment of UNIFIL has proven that the peacekeeping regime has turned out to be a complete and utter failure.
As we already know, Lebanon simultaneously endured a brutal sectarian civil war and Israeli invasion of its territory which spanned nearly 18 years. During this 18 year period, UNIFIL was incapable of restoring international peace and security and assisting the government of Lebanon in reestablishing authority over large swaths of Southern Lebanon. There are those who argue that UNIFIL was prevented from carrying out its mandates by a rampant civil war and unending occupation, forcing UNIFIL to make the decision that protection of the local civil population outweighed the need to forge through with its mandate. I argue that the mandate provided by UNSC resolution 425 (restoration of peace and security), gave the UN, visa-vie UNIFIL, the necessary legal basis to forcefully bring about the cessation of hostilities. The UN was hesitant to commit the resources necessary for UNIFIL to effectively create and then maintain peaceful circumstances. That is the one component of peacekeeping operations that is often overlooked by the UN and other international organizations: in order for peacekeeping operations to commence, an actual peace must first be established. In the case of Lebanon, a peacekeeping force was mandated to “keep peace” in a country that was being torn apart by war. Predictably, UNIFIL was unable to meet its mandates. But the story just begins here.
In April 2000, the United Nations and UNIFIL were notified by the Government of Israel of their intention to begin troop withdrawals in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 425 and 426 in the summer of that year. After 18 years of occupation the Israeli government came to the conclusion that they could no longer maintain, economically or politically, the continued occupation of Southern Lebanon. On June 7, 2000, the Israeli withdrawal from all parts of Southern Lebanon in accordance with 425 and 426 was confirmed by UNIFIL to the UN. At this stage UNIFIL’s most important task was to continue assisting the Lebanese government in restoring Lebanese territorial sovereignty over lands previously occupied by Israel. We know today that after the 2000 withdrawal, the Lebanese terrorist guerilla group/political party, Hizbullah, infiltrated large parts of Southern Lebanon, taking up military positions and establishing fortifications. Once again, UNIFIL was unable to meet its mandate of assisting the Lebanese government in establishing territorial control over Southern Lebanon. This status quo remained in place for several years, during which skirmishes between Hizballah and Israeli forces were common place.
In all fairness to UNIFIL forces, it is widely accepted that the Lebanese government did not fulfill its part in reestablishing its own authority over the region. That having been said, they continually requested for the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, and the UN continually granted the extensions. The UN was tough, at least through words, in its continued push to get Lebanon to take a more active part in re-establishing its authority. While mere verbal requests went unanswered on both ends, UNIFIL continued to suggest through progress reports that Southern Lebanon, aside from occasional skirmishes between Hizballah and Israel, remained relatively calm. This of course turned out to be a mirage; the calm only came as a result of the continued insistence of both Lebanese and UNIFIL officials that Hizballahs re-armament and militarization of Southern Lebanon continue uninhibited. This policy of non-confrontation allowed Hizballah to grow in strength. Again, I argue that although the bulk of the responsibility lies with the Lebanese government’s inability to reaffirm their authority over the entire country, UNIFIL was in a unique position to help establish greater Lebanese control over its territory. In this case, a relative peace was established, and there in fact was a peace to be kept. Moreover, I argue that as part of a peacekeeping organizations mandate to maintain international peace and security, one of its tasks should most certainly be preventing the fortification and delivery and establishment of military positions and arms to supra-governmental authorities. The inability of UNIFIL to carry this task out led to the further degradation of Lebanese sovereignty. In an address at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government in 2007, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Dan Gillerman termed Southern Lebanon as “Hizballahland”, hardly a veiled swipe at UNIFIL’s efforts in the region. Although some might suggest that the Ambassador was caught in an exercise of exaggerated hyperbole, the general sentiment that Southern Lebanon as an entity unto itself is generally accepted as fact.
Years of UNIFIL’s continued abdication of its mandate finally came to a head in July 2006. A heavily armed and fortified Hizbullah carried out a daring cross-border raid during which two soldiers were kidnapped and several others were killed. This raid coincided with a massive barrage of rocket and artillery fire that rained down on the towns and villages of Northern Israel. The encounter quickly escalated to a full out war, complete with aerial bombardment of Beirut as well as Israeli ground invasions of Southern Lebanon, where they met stiff resistance and suffered an unusually high number of fatalities, a testament to the strength Hizbullah was able to attain under UNIFIL’s watch. After nearly a month of intense battle and countless civilian casualties, especially on the Lebanese side, the Security Council passed resolution 1701, which called for the cessation of all hostilities and the further expansion of UNIFIL’s mandate. I argue that this action was the equivalent of giving a larger shovel to a group of people who have already dug an impressive hole.
Among UNIFIL’s new mandates is to “assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related material”. By all accounts, Hizballah has been successful in replenishing its arms in the aftermath of the July 2006 war with Israel. This has been mainly accomplished through Iranian arms shipments that make their way through the Syrian-Lebanon border en route to Hizballah positions throughout the Southern third of the country. As recent events between the government and opposition forces, mainly led by Hizbullah, have shown, there has been very little progress made in re-establishing Lebanese sovereignty over the whole of Lebanon. Arms shipments continue to make their way through Syria, and there continues to be foreign meddling in Lebanon’s internal political and military structures. The Council also authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind. This of course leaves a massive loophole, as UNIFIL cannot possibly operate in all areas of the south, leaving large areas which continue to be re-fortified by Hizbullah today. The Lebanese governments inability to tackle the issue of re-establishing authority over the whole of Lebanon notwithstanding, I continue to argue that it is UNIFIL’s responsibility, pursuant to UNSC resolutions 425, 426 and 1701, to aggressively, not passively, assist, or even take the lead, in helping reestablish this sovereignty. I believe that the legal basis for this aggressive course of UN actions is set forth in all three of these resolutions. Moreover, UNIFIL continues to state in its progress reports that relative calm has persisted since the end of hostilities in August 2006.
It is often said that a period of great calm often precedes the greatest storm.
My hope is to be proven wrong, but history has already proven otherwise.
