This is a paper I wrote a while back for a course at the Harvard Divinity School entitled: Religion and Politics in Current Fundamentalist Movements, taught by Dr. Harvey Cox.
In January 2006, the national Palestinian fundamentalist movement, Hamas, swept into power with a resounding victory in legislative elections. To the western political establishment Hamas is regarded as a terrorist organization, this made their resounding victory all the more surprising to the outside world. The purpose of this paper is to further examine Hamas as a fundamentalist movement, paying specific attention to their approach on issues of governance and politics. By focusing on approaches to governance and politics, I hope to answer the following question: Can Hamas successfully transition from a national fundamentalist movement to a viable governing entity? I will begin by putting in context the origins and evolution of Hamas as a fundamentalist organization. After this framework for understanding Hamas is established, I will solely focus on Hamas’ internal structures as it pertains to politics and governance. The purpose of this exercise is to somehow determine whether Hamas does in fact have the internal infrastructure necessary to be a viable governing entity.
Institutional and Organizational Origins
To fully understand Hamas is to understand not only the acute circumstances under which the organization was formally founded in the late nineteen-eighties, but, also the origins of its institutions and how they were influenced in the time leading up to the organizations formal establishment. To assume, as most do, that Hamas was established solely as a means of combating Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories would belie the historical record. Hamas’ establishment at the start of the 1987 Intifada (uprising) was spurred by a series of socio-economic and political changes. Hamas’s origins are rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, first established in Egypt, and more specifically, in its main institutional embodiment since the late 1970’s, the Islamic Center in the Gaza Strip. After the 1948 War of Independence, Jordan took control over the West Bank and Egypt took control of the Gaza Strip. This provided an opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt to gain a foothold in the Gaza Strip, where they immediately started to organize politically. The Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine generally focused on social and cultural activities, and, unlike their colleagues in Egypt, refrained from active involvement in politics or violence. From this fact we can infer that Hamas’s historical origins are rooted in a collection of social and cultural service programs, not in an ideology of violence, though they would later adopt violent means to compliment their social welfare apparatus.
Another context within which the establishment of Hamas should be presented is one having to do with socio-economics. The organization was successful in making inroads with a local population depressed by deteriorating economic circumstances. Hamas’s ability to capitalize on this social reality by providing an alternative way to challenge poverty, the Islamic way, played a critical role in the nascent stages of the organization. The political circumstances that allowed for the rise of an organization of Hamas’s nature play an equally critical role, and can be directly correlated to the socio-economics of Palestinian society. From the mid nineteen-sixties onward, it was the Palestinian Liberation Organization that claimed the mantle of leadership of the Palestinian cause. Although they played an integral role in representing the Palestinian people on the world stage, they were very much outsiders within the local Palestinian political context. The PLO was largely made up of members of the Palestinian Diaspora, many of whom had very little direct or indirect contact with the Palestinian territories. This absence of political leadership at the local level allowed for the establishment of an organization that not only had the ability to organize locally, but also the infrastructure to deliver the social services necessary to have a functioning, thriving society. Having defined the proper context that Hamas’ establishment should be viewed within; I will now go onto investigating their political and governance apparatus.
Statecraft, Religion, and Democracy
Hamas’ political evolution and its shaping into a (semi) coherent group with ability to impact Palestinian politics were largely due to its paraplegic leader, Sheikh {Ahmad} Yassin. Yasin was recognized as the preeminent MB figure in the Gaza Strip in 1968. Yasin became the driving force behind the rapid rise of the MB movement in the Gaza Strip, which was spearheaded by his institutionally based efforts to imbue the society with da’wa, that is, religious preaching and education. I argue that Sheikh Yassin’s early acknowledgement of the power of institutions as drivers of social progress and support was the critical element of Hamas’ greater plan to achieve widespread popularity among the local Palestinian population. Yasin embarked on establishing a systematic, institutionally organized, penetration of Gaza, by creating cells of three members each through the Strip. Eventually, the movement expanded to the point where Gaza was divided into five sub-districts, each with parallel responsibilities, and all under the direct command of Yasin’s close aides or disciples. This undeveloped network of individuals served as Hamas’ earliest form of government, that is, those who would make the day to day decisions as to what direction the movement and its adherents should move.
When Hamas talks about an Islamic state, what exactly does it mean? The government of the state Hamas advocates consists of an executive, a legislative and a judicial branch. Legislative power rests with a Shura (consultative) Council whose members would be elected in regular elections which would be open to all citizens (including Christians, Jews, communists and secular Muslins). The executive branch would be formed from this Shura Council and judicial power would rest with judges and legal scholars that would operate independent of the other two branches of government. The principle source of legislation would be shari’ah law. Shari’ah is the legal framework by which public and some private aspects of life are regulated for those living in societies where the legal system is based on Islamic principles of jurisprudence. The law is derived from four main sources: the Qu’ran, Hadith, ‘Ijma (consensus of legal scholars) and qiyas.
Religion plays a central role in Hamas’ political and governing philosophies. Again, it is important to present the role of religion as it pertains to Hamas and its activities in the proper context. Religion, in western parlance, is typically believed to be a private, personal system of beliefs. Within Hamas’ cultural framework, religion is a comprehensive system of beliefs and institutions. It is used as a political construct that preserves freedom because it is in harmony with God’s purpose for humanity on earth. This philosophy runs in stark contrast to western philosophies of governance, namely, the separation of Church and State that we enjoy in the United States. Moreover, there are scholars who argue that Hamas’ incorporation of religion in its politics makes Hamas inherently non-democratic. I would argue that this view of a religious movements’ palpability as a governing entity is rather simplistic, and moreover, is an attempt at re-aligning the term with western interests and practices. If we define democracy as an aggregative process to solicit citizens preferences and then to aggregate those preferences to decide what social policies society should be adopted, then Hamas’ activities as such, through both coercing an electorate with social and religious services, and contrasting their philosophies with those of their political rivals, would in fact, fall under the definition of a democratic system of governance. Additionally, a 1999 survey of political and religious attitudes in the Palestinian territories found not only that just 24 percent of respondents believed Islam and democracy to be incompatible, but that those who support political Islam, are actually more likely than others to believe that a political system based on Islamic Law can be democratic.
When observing through a macro-lens current electoral trends within the Arab and Islamic worlds, it is important to note this one reality: The freer and more open elections have been, the more success the Islamist groups have had. If we are to assume that electoral processes are a function of democratic practices, then we can infer that Islamist participation and success in these processes prove that Islamist groups are in fact, not incompatible with democratic forms of governance.
Hamas is as genuine in its democratic conviction as any other political party, in a region inexperienced in this form of governance. Internally, the movement has embraced democratic practices in choosing its leaders. For example, when Hamas was in the process of forming its government in March 2006, the prime minister and all the cabinet ministers were elected by the rank and file. It is also important to note that the Palestinian polity, especially in the post-Yasser Arafat era, is not receptive to any kind of authoritarian rule. If Hamas decided to remain in power contrary to democratic practices, the immediate result would be severe.
I would like to quickly return to the issue of religion as it pertains to the politics of Hamas. As I mentioned earlier, religion plays a central role in Hamas’ organizational and political institutions. This statement is often misconstrued as Hamas being an organization that is solely and exclusively operated by figures of religious significance. This generalization would be the equivalent of associating the Christian leaning Republican Party of the United States as a party that is pre-dominantly run by leaders of the Christian Church. In fact, in the most detailed analysis to date of seventy-four Hamas legislators’ careers, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy lists only twelve as having affiliations with mosques, four as ‘Imams’, one as being involved in a religious court, and three as members of religious committees. Many more legislators are involved in their local mosques, and have some religious knowledge, but; their symbolic capital is not primarily defined by mosque affiliation or religious expertise. In fact, the study goes on to point out the dominance of engineers, medical doctors, and secular university professors in Hamas’ first Cabinet. For reasons pertaining to this study, I would then argue that it is best to characterize Hamas as an organization whose leaders are practitioners of the Islamic faith, but by and large, do not claim to have divine expertise. I felt that this was a very important distinction to make.
Hamas in the Realm of Palestinian Domestic Politics
I will now focus on Hamas’ approach to the Palestinian domestic political arena. Politics in its purest form is based on a series of compromises that ultimately determine who gets what, and how much of it. The ability to compromise is critical in any open political or governmental structure. Hamas has been willing to compromise, or at least fudge, its core message, and put forward eligible non-member candidates instead of party members, where it deemed it advantageous to do so. Case in point is the newly elected Mayor of Nablus, a West Bank town. ‘Adli Ya’ish, a businessman whose family, one of the old notable families of Nablus, owns the local Mercedes-Benz dealership, he is well known for his charitable work, and more importantly, for his good relationship with the Israelis. One of his long-time friends is an Israeli businessman with whom, only months before the election, he agreed in principle to establish a local program promoting coexistence with Israel among Palestinian school children. Ya’ish was first approached by the rival Fatah party, but, when Hamas asked him to lead its list; he agreed to run on the Hamas ticket. This is a clear example of an instance where Hamas has openly compromised on its core principles. That being said, this pattern of behavior is not convincingly consistent, but it is worthwhile to say that the mere openness of Hamas to behave in this fashion does go toward proving the movements’ willingness to compromise as a means of continued existence as a political entity.
Islamic thinkers discern four main strategies that mark the political behavior of Islamic movements: (1) reformist, operating through education, preaching, and guidance; (2) communal, focusing on the Muslim institution of welfare and other social services; (3) political, operating through mass mobilization and public conviction aimed at pressuring rulers to implement the shari’ah; and (4) combatant-political, using military force or violence against the ruling elites. Since Arab regimes began to offer new modes of political participation in the 1980’s, Islamic movements have evolved to a political strategy that centered on gaining access to power. This willingness of Islamic movements to take part in various levels of state-controlled and limited democratic systems demonstrated their belief that they could gain influence and promote their goals by operating within the existing political order. Hamas’ wish to ensure its survival and continued growth necessitated its access to power and resources, based on coexistence with the PA. Again we see a pattern of behavior predicated on survival as a political entity.
Adjustment has become the main feature of Hamas’s political conduct. Their adoption of Palestinian national values, as opposed to pursuing exclusively the goal of an Islamic state, has enabled Hamas to position itself as a viable political alternative to the Palestinian Authority. Now that I have outlined Hamas’s behavioral patterns visa vie the domestic Palestinian political landscape I would like to pay specific attention to the underlying reasons behind Hamas’s stunning rise to power in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections.
It is widely assumed that Hamas’s sweeping victory in national Legislative elections in January 2006 had more to do with the Palestinian electorates “Fatah fatigue”, and disenchantment with the rampant culture of corruption manifested during Yassir Arafat’s leadership of the organization. While there is no question as to the significance this attitude played in the 2006 election, I will present data that argues that certain demographic trends in Palestinian society helped facilitate Hamas’s victory in January 2006. As a rule of thumb, wining political campaigns have one common characteristic: they tend to be able to grab the majority of voters in densely populated areas. In this respect, local Palestinian demographic trends confirm this idea. Hamas supporters were twice as likely as Fatah supporters to live in refugee camps, and a significantly higher proportion of Hamas supporters lived in Gaza City. As the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz noted that in municipal elections of 2005, “only seven of the thirty-eight authorities in which Fatah won have more than 4,000 voters…In contrast, of the 30 authorities in which Hamas won, 11 have more than 4,000 voters…In the Gaza Strip, Hamas won the three largest authorities {with a combined total of 112,000 voters and 284,000 residents}” (‘Fatah takes most councils’, 8 May 2005). This trend continued to manifest itself in the 2006 legislative elections. These numbers lead to the interpretation that Hamas did well because of greater organizational presence in towns, refugee camps, and urban centers. Most of the headquarters of Hamas’ most successful charities are situated in these urban centers and refugee camps. This lends credence to the argument that Hamas’s institutional capacity building efforts, first undertaken by Sheikh Yasin three decades earlier, have paid political dividends. Now that I’ve covered Hamas’s behavioral pattern as it pertains to Palestinian domestic politics, I will proceed by reviewing Hamas in the realm of international politics and relations.
The International Relations of Hamas
Like most non-state actors, Hamas’ ability to survive and develop has been dependent on the actions of other states, which at various points have seen the Islamist organization as an irritant, an enemy, a burden and an opportunity. It is often on the international stage where states, nations, and societies go to find legitimacy. Moreover, it is the international community to which it often falls to bestow such legitimacy. Hamas’ most significant foreign relationships today are with Syria and Iran. Within the Arab/Muslim world Hamas enjoys unparalleled popularity and support. This group includes Iran, Syria, Sudan, Lebanon and Libya, where Hamas has succeeded in establishing official links and has its own offices. Key to Hamas’s continued financial viability has been their ever developing relationship with Iran. Hamas enjoys near full diplomatic status in Teheran. This relationship once again goes toward explaining Hamas’s philosophy on alliance building. Iran is predominantly comprised of practitioners of Shi’a Islam, and has been widely known to support both the Shi’a community in Lebanon as well as the Lebanese Shi’a terrorist organization, Hizb’ullah. This makes their alliance with Hamas all the more interesting since Hamas, and more specifically, Palestinian society, are of the Sunni Islam persuasion. I argue that this reality further proves Hamas’s willingness to compromise on its core beliefs in order to achieve longer term political and geo-strategic goals.
With predictably strong ties with the Arab and Islamic world, I feel it is more important to now delve into Hamas’s relationship with the western political establishment. The main reason for this is that it is the very western liberal political institutions that govern the legitimacy of movements, states, and nations, that Hamas has had the most tenuous relationships with. Hamas’s relationship with the west has been of two different natures. These attitudes form along the fault line of US-Hamas relations, which can be described as non-existent at best, and Hamas-Europe relations which can be described as more cordial. Hamas looks at Europe as a diverse pool of powers. What separates individual European countries on major foreign issues, demonstrated in the lack of an effective common EU foreign policy, transcends what unites them. The US perception of Hamas by and large mirrors the Israeli one. I argue that the one major obstacle hindering Hamas’s ability to become a full fledged political force is its lack of support, or, dialogue, with the Western world. Within the paradigm of Hamas’s relations with the west, this has been one area where Hamas has not shown willingness to compromise on its own principles. The two most notable obstacles are Hamas’s unwillingness to recognize the State of Israel and cease all terrorist activities. These are the two most prominent parameters that western powers, and Israel, have set in order establish some sort of dialogue with Hamas. Hamas argues that as long as Israel continues to be an occupying power they cannot do any of the above. Either way you look at it, these issues have served as a major impediment to Hamas being able to establish itself as a legitimate organization in western eyes. On the flip side, there hardened stance toward the west can help burnish their credentials with the Palestinian electorate. It is an electorate that has observed for the better part of the last decade a Palestinian Authority that has been bestowed legitimacy by the West and Israel while at the same time having very little to show for it.
Conclusions and Final Thoughts
Can Hamas successfully transition from a national fundamentalist movement to a viable governing entity? I believe the evidence presented throughout this paper proves that Hamas in fact does have the institutional capacity to serve as a viable governing entity. Moreover, Hamas has shown a propensity to politick, that is, undertake a series of compromises for the purposes of maintaining and expanding its political viability. I’m sure you’ll notice in this paper a glaring omission, and it was not by mistake, but rather by design. You’ll notice that nowhere in this paper do I mention Hamas’s terrorist activities against the State of Israel. As I outlined at the outset of this paper, the purpose of this paper was to exclusively focus on Hamas’s capabilities within the realm of its politics and governance. Some would argue that Hamas’s terrorist activities are part of their overall strategies on politics and governance. I argue that the mention of terrorism allows others to detract from the truly impressive political and social service institutions that Hamas has built over a period of two decades. Moreover, I believe the introduction of the issue of terrorism allows for an inaccurate distillation of the overall problems facing both the Palestinians and Israelis. Having said that, and in light of the events of 14 May 2008, where a Katyusha grad rocket launched from Hamas controlled Gaza Strip found its way to a populated mall in the Israeli city of Ashkelon, I do personally condemn Hamas’s terrorist activities. I felt that it was important for the author of this paper to make unequivocally clear their condemnation of any terrorist activities, while at the same time being able to objectively present Hamas’s truly remarkable accomplishments over the course of the past two decades. I hope in this paper, this is what I have been able to do.
1 Gunning, Jerome. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 34.
2Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 16.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5 Chehab, Zaki. Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement. New York: Avalon, 2007. 103.
6 Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 19.
7 Literally, a call (for submission to Allah). Practically, it became a code name for social and cultural activities, primarily Islamic preaching, education and social welfare, conducted by the MB.
8 Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 19.
9 Ibid.
10 Gunning, Jerome. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 57.
11 Ibid.
12 Islam, Governing Under Shari’a, Council on Foreign Relations, 2005. <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=8034#2>
13 Ibid.
14 Gunning, Jerome. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 65.
15 Ibid.
16 Gunning, Jerome. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.160.
17 Lecture, April 2008, Dr. Noah Feldman, Professor Harvard Law School
18 Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2006. 64.
19 Ibid.
20 Gunning, Jerome. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 162.
21 Gunning, Jerome. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 157.
22 Ibid.
23 Yusuf al-Qardawi, al-Hall al-Islami: Farida wa-Darura {The Islamic Solution: Duty and Necessity}, 5th ed. Cairo: Maktabat Wahaba, 1993, pg.155-192; Fathi Yakan, Nahwa Haraka Islamiyya ‘Alamiyya Wahida {Toward One Global Islamic Movement}, 3d ed. Beirut: Mu’assassat al-Risala, 197, pp. 8-21.
24 Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 118.
25 Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 147.
26 Gunning, Jerome. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 148.
27Ibid. 149.
28 Chehab, Zaki. Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement. New York: Avalon, 2007. 129.
29 Ibid. 134.
30 Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2006. 93.
31 Ibid. 93.
32 Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2006. 113.
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